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Making The Right Step Under The Wrong Authority: Kansas’s 
Expansion of CERCLA to Include State Statutes of Repose 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Exposure to dangerous substances such as pharmaceutical drugs, 
pesticides, or chemicals can be destructive to both human health and 
property. When an injury arises, those affected may want to bring a toxic tort 
claim as recompense. Toxic tort suits are often brought as class actions on 
behalf of groups of people that have been injured, such as a neighborhood of 
residents who have been exposed to toxic drinking water. Although the 
elements of a toxic tort case vary according to the exact theories raised by the 
complainant, generally, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the substance was 
dangerous; (2) the plaintiff was exposed to the substance; and (3) the 
substance caused harm to the plaintiff. However, before a plaintiff can even 
begin to meet their burden of proof, they may be required to prove that their 
suit is not barred by procedural defenses—including statutes of limitations 
and statutes of repose.  
When considering the nature of an injury in a toxic tort claim, it is not 
uncommon that a plaintiff will notice the injury several years after exposure 
to the substance. Thus, legislation such as the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act  (CERCLA) attempts to ensure plaintiffs will have a 
remedy for toxic injuries—20, 30, or even 40 years after exposure to an 
allegedly dangerous substance. The United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas was faced with deciding whether a federal statute of 
limitations and/or the State statute of repose would bar a suit by the Mechlers 
in Mechler v. U.S.
2
   
The Court held that the FTCA’s statute of limitations did not bar the 
plaintiff’s claim because a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the 
                                                 
1
 No. 12-1183-EFM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Aug. 2, 2013). 
2
 See infra note 34.  
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groundwater contamination on his or her property before the statute had run.
3
 
Concerning Kansas’ statute of repose, the Court wrestled with whether 
CERCLA’s preemption over state statutes of limitations should also apply to 
states’ statutes of repose, even though CERCLA only explicitly refers to 
statutes of limitations. In the end, the Court expanded CERCLA’s reach by 





II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
Chris and Wallace Mechler (Plaintiffs), husband and wife, own title to 
a residence and 52 acres of real estate in Berrytown, Kansas.
5
 Until 1973, the 
Government (Defendant), through the United States Department of the Air 
Force (Air Force), operated a base across the road from Plaintiffs’ property.6 
During its operation, the east side of the base had two landfills where waste 
generated from the base was accepted, with the North Landfill being adjacent 
to both Plaintiffs’ and Wallace Mechler’s father’s (Mechler Sr.) property.7 
Years after the base closed, tests performed by both the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
(KDHE) showed that well-water on Plaintiffs’ property had been 
contaminated with trichloroethene and vinyl chloride that exceeded the 
regulatory limits for drinking-water.
8
 Plaintiffs filed suit against the 
Government, alleging that the leeching of hazardous chemicals from the 
former Air Force base caused damage to their property.
9
 
In 1994, the Corps began an environmental investigation of the 
former base.
10
 The Corps took a series of samples from wells installed near 
                                                 
3
 See infra note 36. 
4
 See infra note 37. 
5
 Id.   
6
 Id. at 2.  
7
 Id.   
8
 Id. at 6.  
9
 Id. at 1.  
10
 Id. at 2.  




 Samples taken from a well between the northern landfill and 
Mechler Sr.’s property in October 1999 and January 2000 discovered vinyl 
chloride concentrations exceeding regulatory limits for safe drinking-water.
12
 
In September 2000, the Corps, along with the KDHE, took samples from 
additional wells, including wells that provide water to Plaintiffs’ and Mechler 
Sr.’s homes.13 Results from the September 2000 testing revealed that water 
on Plaintiffs’ land was within regulatory limits, but water at Mechler Sr.’s 
home exceeded the limit for vinyl chloride.
14
  
The KDHE notified the Corps and Mechler Sr. about the 
contamination.
15
 In a meeting with Mechler Sr. and Plaintiff Wally Mechler 
on September 26, 2000, the Corps informed Wally that it believed the 
contaminants had leeched from the landfill, to the groundwater, and then into 
Mechler Sr.’s well.16 To ensure Plaintiffs and Mechler Sr. had clean drinking 
water, the Corps installed whole-house granular activated carbon (GAC) 
units in both homes and offered to cover the expense of Plaintiffs and 
Mechler Sr. connecting to water lines from the City of Topeka.
17
 Despite the 
installation of the GAC units, Plaintiff Wally expressed a belief that the 
contamination of Mechler Sr.’s untreated well water had ruined the value of 
Mechler Sr.’s property, and that the Corps should reimburse that loss.18 
Plaintiffs and Mechler Sr. also declined the Corps’ offer to connect them to 
city water lines because it would require annexation of their property to the 
city, subjecting them to city taxes and ordinances.
19
  
In the years following the discovery of the contamination, seventeen 
additional groundwater-monitoring wells were installed on and around the 
landfill, Plaintiff’s property, and Mechler Sr.’s property.20 Plaintiffs received 
                                                 
11
 Id.   
12
 Id.   
13
 Id.   
14
 Id. at 2-3.  
15
 Id. at 3.  
16
 Id.   
17
 Id. at 3, 4.  
18
 Id. at 4.  
19
 Id.   
20
 Id.  
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copies of the reports and were told that they would be notified if 
contamination ever reached their property.
21
 In the reports, each well was 
assigned an abbreviated code to describe its location.
22
 Plaintiffs believed the 
wells on Mechler Sr.’s property were designated as “MSR” for “Mechler 
Sr.,” while believing wells located on Plaintiffs’ property were labeled 
“PVW-MJR” for “Mechler Jr.”23 
In a letter sent to Plaintiffs on April 3, 2009, the Corps revealed 
results of samples collected in October 2008 and March 2009.
24
 The letter 
began by listing the wells’ codes.25 Two of the five wells listed (MSR-03 and 
OW-20), however, did not specify whether they were located on Plaintiffs’ or 
Mechler Sr.’s property.26 Plaintiffs believed that these two wells were located 
on Mechler Sr.’s front yard, especially after the Corps renamed OW-20 to 
OW-MSR-05.
27
 OW-MSR-05 was, to the contrary of Plaintiffs’ belief, 
installed on Plaintiffs’ property.28 An April 2009 letter showed that 
trichloroethene and vinyl chloride exceeded regulatory limits in well OW-
MSR-05.
29
 After testing well OW-MSR-05 again and installing an additional 
well on Plaintiff’s property, the Corps sent a letter to Plaintiffs dated June 20, 
2010, notifying Plaintiffs that the well water on their property had also been 
contaminated.
30
 Plaintiffs contend that this was the first time they were told 
that new wells installed on their property had been sampled.
31
  
Plaintiffs first filed an administrative claim with the Department of 
the Air Force.
32
 However, because the Air Force failed to dispose of the 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 5.  
22
 Id.  
23
 Id.  
24
 Id.  
25
 Id.  
26
 Id. MSR-03 was identified as an upgrade from Plaintiffs’ PVW-MJR cistern. OW-20 
was identified as the “[n]ewly installed monitoring well east of barn in the field.”  
27
 Id. at 6.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Id.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 6-7. 
32
 Id. at 7.  
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claim within six months after it was filed, Plaintiffs were permitted to file suit 
in federal court under the FTCA, alleging that the leeching of hazardous 
chemicals from a former Air Force base caused damage to their property.
33
 In 
response, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss due to lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the two-year 




In denying the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction
35
, the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas held that: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the FTCA’s two-
year statute of limitations because a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the contamination on Plaintiffs’ property more than two years 
before Plaintiffs filed suit;
36
 and, (2) Plaintiffs’ claims have not been 
extinguished under Kansas’ statute of repose because CERCLA preempts 
state statutes of repose.
37
  
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
First, this section will describe the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 
Second, it will compare states’ statutes of repose with states’ statutes of 
limitations. Third, it will highlight the interaction of State statutes of repose 
with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA). Fourth, this section will trace the decisions of 
courts that have addressed whether CERCLA preempts state statutes of 
repose in addition to state statutes of limitations. Lastly, this section will trace 
a line of United States Supreme Court cases that may suggest that preempting 
state statutes of repose violates due process for defendants.   
                                                 
33
 Id.   
34
 Id.   
35
 Id. at 1. 
36
 Id. at 17. 
37
 Id. at 25.  
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The FTCA is a limited waiver of governmental sovereign immunity 
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
38
 Under specified circumstances, the 
FTCA renders the Government liable for monetary damages for various 
injuries caused by the negligence of Government employees.
39
 A FTCA 
action is generally governed by the law of the state where the tortious act 
occurred; thus, governmental liability is only created if the act is a tort in that 
respective state.
40
 Before a plaintiff can successfully maintain a FTCA action, 
they must have first exhausted all other administrative remedies prior to 
filing suit.
41
 There are numerous explicit exceptions to this waiver, including 
any claim based on the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function
42
 or duty on the part of a federal agency or 
                                                 
38
 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) states that the “district courts…shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages…injury 
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment.”  
39
 Id. See also Lanus v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2731, 2732 (U.S. 2013) (stating that the 
United States can be “liable to all persons, including servicemen, injured by the negligence 
of Government employees”). 
40
 31 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 73:443; See also U.S. v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005) (Holding 
that the “FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity only where local law 
would make a private person liable in tort, not where local law would make a state or 
municipal entity liable, even where uniquely governmental functions are at issue”).  
41
  McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 107 (2003).  
42
 To determine whether the discretionary function exception will bar suit against the 
Government, several principles must be applied. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 
531 (1988). First, it must be asked whether the discretionary conduct “involves an element of 
judgment or choice” by the employee; if it does not, then there “is no discretion in the 
conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect.” Id. at 536. Consequently, if a 
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically sets out the conduct for an employee to 
follow, the discretionary function exception will not apply. Id. Second, if the “challenged 
conduct involves an element of judgment,” the Court must decide if it should be shielded by 
the discretionary function exception. Id. Ultimately, the Court stated that the exception will 
shield Government only if the challenged conduct “involves the permissible exercise of 
policy judgment;” thus, only “governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of 
public policy” are protected. Id. at 537. In Berkovitz, the Court declined to apply the 
discretionary function exception, deciding that the licensing of a polio vaccine that harmed 
the claimant was not barred by the discretionary function exception. However, in U.S. v. 
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employee, whether or not that discretion is abused.
43
 The exceptions aim to 
set the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability on 
the U.S. and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from 
exposure to suit by private individuals.
44
 
In U.S. v. Kubrick, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
the FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations.
45
 The Court explained 
that the true “purpose of the limitations statute” is to “require the reasonably 
diligent presentation of tort claims against the Government,” and that when a 
plaintiff is “in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt” and 
knows “who has inflicted the injury,… accrual” on the claim will begin.46 
Thus, the Court decided that the statute of limitations did not begin to run for 
a veteran that was treated at a government hospital until he became aware 
that he was infected.
47
 
A statute of repose is similar to a statute of limitation, except it is 
broader.
48
 Like statutes of limitation, statutes of repose may originate either 
statutorily or by common law.
49
 However, statutes of repose are generally 
                                                                                                                         
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), the Court ruled that federal regulators' supervision of a 
savings and loan association's operations involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of 
public policy goals and was within the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary 
function exception. 24 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 329. See also Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 
487 U.S. 500 (1988); U.S. v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797 
(1984); Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15 (1953).  
43
 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(2012).  
44
 U.S. v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984).  
45
 U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).  
46
 Id. at 122-123.  
47
 Id. at 116.   
48
 Peter E . Seley & Coral A. Shaw, McDonald v. Sun Oil: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Constitutionally Questionable Expansion of CERCLA’s Toxic Tort Discovery Rule, 39 ELR 
10197 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Seley-
Shaw-McDonaldvSunOil.pdf at 1.  
49
 Douglas S. Arnold & Benjamin L. Snowden, CERCLA SECTION 9658 AND STATE 
RULES OF REPOSE--Two Decades After Passage, Unanimity Still Elusive On Basic 
Question Of Statutory Interpretation, http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/44e8cf2e-
e2cd-4d18-bb1d-798772f8b676/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b2c26b5c-eba6-4f7c-
8537-7c1737181933/CERCLA%20.pdf at 2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
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longer than statutes of limitation and are not generally subject to tolling.
50
 
This is because while a statute of limitation begins to run once a plaintiff is 
injured by a tortious act, a statute of repose begins to run after the completion 
of a tortious act, regardless of whether a plaintiff has been injured or whether 
plaintiff’s injury is manifest.51 In other words, it is irrelevant under a statute 
of repose as to when an individual discovers their injury.
52
 
Also, “[w]hile a statute of limitations generally is procedural and 
extinguishes the remedy rather than the right,… [a statute of] repose is 
substantive and extinguishes both the remedy and the actual action.”53 
Consequently, a statute of repose “creates a substantive right in those 
protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined length of 
time.”54 “In other words, a statute of repose establishes a ‘right not to be 
sued,’” for a potential defendant.55 Kansas’ ten-year statute of repose, Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 60-513, asserts that “in no event shall an action be commenced 
more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of 
action.” Section 60-513(b) applies to specifically enumerated causes of 
action.
56
 Like Kansas, most states have repose statutes that cover a broad 
                                                 
50
 Id. “Tolling generally operates by delaying the date on which a plaintiff’s claim 
accrues, and on which the statute as a result begins to run.” Id.  
51




 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 32 (2000). 
54
 First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d at 862, 
866 (4th Cir. 1989). 
55
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d at 355, 363 (5th Cir. 
2005). 
56
 The specific enumerated causes of action in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 513(a) that should be 
brought within two years are:  
(1) An action for trespass upon real property. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including 
actions for the specific recovery thereof. (emphasis added) 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered. 
(4) An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and 
not herein enumerated. 
(5) An action for wrongful death. 
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range of actions that can implicate injury from hazardous substances within 
the scope of CERCLA.
57
 CERCLA, however, only explicitly mentions 
“statutes of limitation,” and not state “statutes of repose.”58  
CERCLA is federal legislation that was enacted in 1980 to “promote 
efficient and equitable responses to the fallout from hazardous wastes.”59 
Immediately after CERCLA was enacted, Congress conducted a study which 
found that “injuries from toxic torts often [took] years to manifest” and that 
“many states’ statutes of limitations would run before the plaintiff [was] 
aware of the injury.”60 In response to this study, Congress enacted the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986, which 
included a federal “discovery rule” in § 9658.61  
Section 9658 applies to “any action brought under State law for 
personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by 
exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released 
into the environment from a facility.”62 Under § 9658, if any state statute of 
limitation’s commencement date (when tolling begins) came before the 
federally required commencement date (“FRCD”), “the FRCD [will be used] 
in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.”63 The FRCD is defined as 
“the date the plaintiff [knew] (or reasonably should have known) that the 
personal injury or property damages . . . were caused or contributed to by the 
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”64  
                                                                                                                         
(6) An action to recover for an ionizing radiation injury as provided in K.S.A. 
60-513a, 60-513b and 60-513c, and amendments thereto. 
(7) An action arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional 
services by a health care provider, not arising on contract. 
57




 Mechler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466, at 21. 
60
 Id. at 22.  
61
 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 
203(a), 100 Stat. 1613, 1695 (1986). 
62
 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(2).  
63
 § 9658(a)(1). 
64
 § 9658(b)(4)(A). 
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“Section 9658 is ‘hardly a model of legislative clarity,’ ” and there is 
still much debate concerning its scope.
65
 Although district courts have largely 
similarly found that CERCLA § 9658 preempts state statutes of limitations,
66
 
the circuits have come to different conclusions as to whether § 9658 preempts 
state statutes of repose.”67 While the Fifth Circuit believes that “the plain 
language of § 9658—which uses the phrase ‘statute of limitations’ five 
times—clearly show[s] that Congress intended to preempt only statutes of 
limitations,”68 the Ninth and Fourth Circuits have found ambiguity in § 9658, 
pointing to CERCLA’s legislative history and the common interchangeable 
use of “the terms ‘statute of limitation’ and ‘statute of repose’ . . . at the time 
Congress enacted § 9658.”69 The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 




Aside from the debate over § 9658’s interpretation, the preemption of 
state statutes of repose may raise a serious question of due process for 
defendants.
71
 If the FRCD is ever held to affect a case where the repose 
period ended prior to SARA’s enactment, § 9658 could essentially “revive” a 
cause of action that is substantively extinct (as opposed to only being 
procedurally barred by a statute of limitations).
72
 And because a rule of 
repose “creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability 
                                                 
65
 Arnold, supra note 49, at 4. 
66
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d at 358 (holding 
that § 9658  does not preempt state statutes of repose); But see Waldburger v. CTS Co., 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13942 (holding that § 9658  does preempt state statutes of repose); See 
also McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008). 
67
 Id. at 22-23. See Burlington, 419 F.3d at 355 (holding that § 9658  does not preempt 
state statutes of repose); But see Waldburger v. CTS Co., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13942 
(holding that § 9658  does preempt state statutes of repose); See also McDonald v. Sun Oil 
Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008). 
68
 Mechler v. United States, 12-1183-EFM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466, at 23 (D. 




 Brief for Peter Waldburger, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 13, 
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 2012 WL 3528328 (C.A.4) (No. 12-1290).   
71
 Arnold, supra note 49, at 7. 
72
 Id. 
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after a legislatively-determined length of time,” preempting their repose 
rights could also arguably violate their due process rights.
73
 
There are several United States Supreme Court cases that deal with 
the revival of extinct claims and that give a guide as to when a revival either 
violates a defendant’s due process or not.74 Early Supreme Court cases (the 
“Campbell line of cases”) range from 1885 to 1945 and focus heavily on 
whether the nature of the legislature’s set time limits concern the remedy or 
the cause of action.
75
 By contrast, more recent Supreme Court cases dealing 
with this issue ranging from 1976 to 1992 (the “Usery line of cases”) suggest 
that the application of § 9658 to rules of repose may be constitutional—as 
long as it can meet the due process test of showing that the retroactive 
legislation is justified by a rational legislative purpose.
76
 
 In Campbell v. Holt,
77
 the Court stated that “in an action to recover 
real or personal property, where the question is as to the removal of the bar of 
the statute of limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar has become 
perfect . . . such act deprives the party of his property without due process of 
law.”78 However, the Court held that this did not apply for an action on a 
contract, because “the statute of limitations does not destroy the right . . . but 
only bars the remedy.”79 The Court similarly held twenty years later in Davis 
v. Mills
80
 that, when dealing with personal or real property, “the title . . . 
passes [when] the statute [of limitations] has run.”81 The Court thus stated 
that the “[t]he lapse of time limited by such statutes not only bars the remedy, 
but it extinguishes the right, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder.”82  
Another 20 years later, in 1925, the Court in William Danzer & Co. v. 
Gulf & Shop Island Railway Co. stated that although cases like Campbell 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 5. 
74
 Seley, supra note 48, at 3.  
75
 Id.  
76
 Id.   
77
  Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).  
78
 Id. at 623. 
79
 Id. at 624.  
80
 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).  
81
 Id. at 457. 
82
 Id.  
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(where “statutory provisions fix[es] the time within which suits must be 
brought”) apply to the remedy only, sometimes these provisions “constitute a 
part of the definition of a cause of action created by the same or another 
provision, and operates as a limitation upon liability.”83 In other words, 
sometimes these provisions operate as a statute of repose. Lastly, in Chase 
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, the Court did not think that “lifting the bar of 
a statute of limitations,” and restoring a plaintiff’s remedy “lost through a 
mere lapse of time” was “per se an offense against the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”84 Thus, the Campbell line of cases seem to suggest that when a 
statute sets a time limit on a purely procedural action, and does not create a 
vested interest for the defendant, there is no due process violation when the 
government alters that time limit;
85
 and accordingly, that altering the time 
period for a statute that does, however, create a vested interest in the 
defendant may violate that defendant’s due process.86  
In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., the Court rejected the 
arguments of coalmine operators that Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969 (FCMS) violated their due process.
87
 The 
FCMS deemed certain operators liable for a miner’s injury arising out of 
employment in the mines.
88
 Concerning liability of the operators who had left 
the mine before the FCMS was enacted, the miners argued that the FCMS 
“spread costs in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability upon 
past employment relationships, rather than taxing all coal mine operators 
presently in business.”89  
The Court stated that the “retrospective aspects of legislation, as well 
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process.”90 When 
                                                 
83
 William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & S.I.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 637 (1925).  
84
 Chase Sec. Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945).  
85
 Id.at 314.  
86
 Seley, supra note 48, at 3-4. 
87
 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
88
 Id. at 2.   
89
 Id. at 18. The Operators did not challenge Congress’ power to impose the burden of 
past min working conditions on the industry. Id. 
90
 Id. at 17. 
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evaluating the “justification for the retrospective imposition of liability,” the 
Court considered “the possibilit[y] that the Operators may not have known of 
the danger of their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis.”91 Furthermore, 
the Court considered that even if the Operators knew of the danger, “their 
conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the current state of the law, 
which imposed no liability on them for disabling pneumoconiosis.”92 
Ultimately, after applying rational basis analysis, the Court held that “the 
imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past [was] 
justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ 
disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor,” 
including the past operators.
93
  
Eight years after Usery, in Pension Benefit Guar. Co. v. R.A. Gray & 
Co., an action was brought that challenged the application of the withdrawal 
liability provisions (requiring employer withdrawing to pay a fixed amount) 
of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPA) to employers 
who withdrew from their pension plans during the five-month period 
preceding enactment of the MPPA.
94
 Citing Usery, the Court found 
Congress’ decision to apply the MPPA was supported by a rational 
legislative purpose, and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause.
95
 In this 
particular context, the Court explained that “it was eminently rational for 
Congress to conclude that the purposes of the MPPA could be more fully 
effectuated if its withdrawal liability provisions were applied retroactively.”96  
Most recently, in General Motors Co. v. Romein, although the Court 
noted that “[r]etroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are 
more serious than those posed by prospective legislation,”97 it upheld a 
Michigan law under rational basis analysis, which required coordination of 
workers’ compensation benefits despite the fact that, as a result of the 
coordination, some companies were forced to refund money to disabled 




 Id.  
93
 Id. at 18.  
94
 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 726 (1984).  
95
 Id. at 734.  
96
 Id. at 730.  
97
 Gen. Motors Co. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).  
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 Thus, the Usery line of cases takes the focus off whether the 
retrospective legislation concerns the remedy or the cause of action, and puts 
it on whether it is justified by a rational legislative purpose.
99
  
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A. FTCA 
First, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas held 
that when a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered a contamination 
on the plaintiff’s property more than two years before the plaintiff filed suit, 
the plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of 
limitations.
 100
 The court began its analysis with deciding whether, prior to 
September 20, 2009, the Mechlers knew or had reason to know that the 
chemicals from Forbes Field travelled to and contaminated their land.
101
  The 
government expressed four arguments as to why Plaintiffs had knowledge 
that their land was contaminated by chemicals from Forbes Field—all of 
which were rejected by the court.
102
 
The court rejected the Government’s first argument that Plaintiffs had 
sufficient knowledge of the contamination on their property to trigger the 
statute of limitations at three points prior to September 20, 2009.
103
 In a May 
28, 2009, phone call between Plaintiff Wally and a Corps employee, the 
Government argues that the employee specified that the contamination was 
on Plaintiffs’ property.104 Plaintiffs agree that the employee told them that 
well OW-20 was contaminated;
105
 Plaintiffs deny, however, that the 
employee specified that the contamination was on Plaintiff’s property.106 The 
                                                 
98
 Seley, supra note 48, at 4. 
99
 Id.  
100
Mechler v. United States, 12-1183-EFM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466, at 23 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 23, 2012).  
101
 Id. at 12.  
102
 Id. at 12-17.  
103
 Id. at 13-14.  
104




 Id. The Government submitted a copy of the employee’s notes of the phone call, but 
 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1 
265 
court stated that this conversation did not resolve the parties’ dispute about 
the substance of the call and, furthermore, after reviewing the map depicting 
the locations of the monitoring wells, well OW-MSR-05 (formerly OW-20) 
was either on or close to the border between Plaintiffs’ property and Mechler 
Sr.’s.107 For these reasons, the Court stated that it could not find that 




The court also rejected the Government’s second argument that a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff should have noted the information in an 
addendum
109
 they signed and recalled the conversation with the Corps 
employee four months prior (when the employee said that OW-20 showed 
contamination) to collectively realize Plaintiffs’ property was 
contaminated.
110
 The court stated that it is unreasonable to expect that 
Plaintiffs, who were responsible for monitoring the status of their own 
property and Mechler Sr.’s, would recall during the signing of a lease 




 The court next rejected the Government’s third argument that 
Plaintiffs should have known that their groundwater was contaminated when 
they received the testing results from the Corps on September 1, 2009, which 
showed that the well labeled OW-MSR-05 contained excessive amounts of 
trichloroethene and vinyl chloride.
112
 The court stated that the letter from the 
Corps did not explicitly state that excessive levels of trichloroethene or vinyl 
                                                                                                                         
they do not resolve the parties’ dispute about the substance of the call. Although the notes 
appear to read, “Mechler asked if OW under his property is contaminated the answer was 
Yes,” it is unclear whether Plaintiff Wally actually asked about the “OW under his property” 
or if the note-taker, in summarizing the conversation, simply used that phrase to identify 




 Id. at 13-14.  
109
 Plaintiffs signed an addendum in August 2009 to a lease agreement that specifically 
stated that well OW-20 was to be renamed well OW-MSR-05 and was located on Plaintiffs’ 
property. Id. at 14.  
110
 Id. at 14-15.  
111
 Id. at 15.  
112
 Id. 
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chloride were detected on “Plaintiffs’ property” because the brief description 
following the code for well OW-20/OW-MSR-05 read: “Newly Installed 
monitoring well east of barn in the field.”113 The court stated that given that 
the barn is located on Mechler Sr.’s property and the code “MSR” in other 
contexts stands for “Mechler Sr.,” Plaintiffs’ failure to identify contamination 
on their property form the September 1, 2009 results was not unreasonable.
114
 
Lastly, the Government asked the court to find that a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have pieced together disparate pieces of 
information
115
 from notices sent months apart, which independently inferred 
that Plaintiffs’ groundwater was contaminated. The court stated that it 
believed the Government “affords the reasonable person too much sleuthing 
prowess and too little faith in government assurances,” and that ultimately, it 
agrees with Plaintiffs that they did not have knowledge that the 
contamination had leeched onto their property until they received the June 
2010 results from the Corps.
116
 Thus, the court stated that Plaintiffs’ claims 
fall within the FTCA’s statute of limitations.117   
B.  CERCLA 
Second, the court held that the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preempt state statutes of repose 
and thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not extinguished under Kansas’ statute of 
repose.
118
 The court stated that in order to decide whether Kansas’ statute for 
repose had extinguished Plaintiffs’ claim, the court must first consider 
whether Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) encompasses Plaintiffs’ claim;119 
                                                 
113
 Id. at 15-16.  
114
 Id. at 16.  
115
 The Government concedes that despite the constant monitoring and contact between 
Plaintiffs and the Corps, Plaintiffs never received a single notice that simultaneously 
informed them that (1) the OW-20/OW-MSR-05 well was located on Plaintiffs’ property, 
and (2) excessive amounts of trichloroethene and vinyl chloride were found in well OW-






 Id. at 20-21. 
119
 Id. at 17.  
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second, the court stated that it must analyze split circuit case law addressing 
the question of whether CERCLA preempts state statutes of repose.
120
  
First, the court held that § 60-513(b) does encompass Plaintiffs’ 
claim.
121
 The court stated that Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the ten-year 
statute of repose found in § 60-513(b) because § 60-513(a)(4) encompasses 





 Second, although Plaintiffs’ claims were subjected to Kansas’ 
ten-year statute of repose, the court adopted the reasoning of the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits and held that Congress intended for Section 9658 of CERCLA 
to preempt both state statutes of limitation and repose for causes of action 
arising from delayed injuries from hazardous waste.
124
  
The court reasoned that applying § 60-513(b) to Plaintiffs’ claims 
would mean Plaintiffs’ cause of action was extinguished in 1983—seventeen 
years before any of the Mechlers learned of the contamination of their 
groundwater.
125
 The court further stated that to hold that the Kansas statute of 
repose prohibits Plaintiffs’ claim would defeat Congress’s intent to provide 
an avenue of relief for those suffering from delayed injuries caused by 
hazardous wastes in the environment.
126
 Accordingly, the court held that 
Plaintiffs’ cause of action against the Government is not extinguished under 
Kans. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) and that the court maintains its subject matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.127  
V.  COMMENT  
Although Mechler correctly adheres to the “discovery rule” of Section 
9658 of CERCLA for statutes of limitation, Mechler erroneously expands the 
scope of § 9658 to include Kansas’ statute of repose. Mechler’s expansion is 




 Id. at 20.  
122
  See supra note 56. 
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 Mechler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466 at 20. 
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not without merit. Mechler takes a positive step for Kansas citizens in 
expanding the scope of relief available to private individuals who are harmed 
by toxic tortious conduct—who otherwise would be blocked due to an 
expired limitation period; the means by which Mechler takes that step, 
however, encroaches upon Congress’ power, and is thus outside of the scope 
of the District Court’s power. Additionally, the preemption of state statutes of 
repose may raise serious constitutional questions concerning violation of due 
process for defendants who are not federal agencies.
 128
 
Before SARA was enacted in 1986, plaintiffs with latent injuries such 
as those caused by toxic substances were at a major disadvantage.
129
 Some 
state statutes of limitation began when an individual was injured (e.g. first 
exposed to a substance on one’s job), instead of when one first realized they 
had a claim.
130
 SARA’s addition of the discovery rule to § 9658  of CERCLA 
closed the gap in this shortcoming by requiring individuals to have 
“discovered” the injury before the statute of limitation began to run131–a 
significant step for one harmed by a toxic substance, which could take over a 
decade to manifest.  
Mechler’s holding goes one step further than SARA, and declares that 
the discovery rule should also cover the state statutes of repose. Section 9658, 
however, does not explicitly mention state statutes of repose. Although 
statutes of repose are similar to statutes of limitation in that they also limit the 
time in which a plaintiff can file a claim, they are not identical. There are 
several important distinctions between the two that suggest that courts should 
not presume that they are interchangeable for § 9658 purposes.
132
  
                                                 
128
 A due process violation was not raised by the Federal Government in Mechler. This 
is chiefly due to the fact that the Federal Government does not have rights, only duties or 
responsibilities. Congress has complete power over the air force, having the power to cut its 
funding or to disband it. However, if the defendant in Mechler had been part of the private 
sector (e.g. a nuclear waste company), it is highly likely a due process defense would have 
been raised.   
129






 See supra notes 48-57. 
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Courts on both the district and circuit level wrestle with the dilemma 
of whether Congress intended for statutes of repose to be interchangeably 





 have similarly determined that § 9658 preempts state statutes of 
repose; however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Alabama
135
 and the South Dakota Supreme Court
136
 have determined that 
they do not.  
The Fifth Circuit in 2005 was the first circuit court to address this 
issue; it held that § 9658 does not preempt state statues of repose;
137
 stating 
that “the plain language of § 9658—which uses the phrase ‘statute of 
limitations’ five times—clearly showed that Congress intended to preempt 
only statutes of limitations.”138 The Ninth and Fourth Circuits disagreed with 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding; they believe “the language of the statute is 
ambiguous because, at the time Congress enacted § 9658, courts across the 
country used the terms ‘statute of limitation’ and ‘statute of repose’ 
interchangeably.”139 The Ninth and Fourth Circuits thus held that “Congress 
intended § 9658 to preempt state statutes of repose with a limitations period 
that included no expiration of the cause of action.”140 After reviewing the 
Study conducted by Congress, the Ninth circuit further explained that 
“Congress’s primary concern in enacting [§ 9658] was to adopt the discovery 
rule in situations where a plaintiff may lose a cause of action before 
becoming aware of it . . . this predicament can be caused by either statutes of 
limitation or statutes of repose, and is probably most likely to occur where 
statutes of repose operate.”141 Mechler sides with the Fourth and Ninth 
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 See Buggsi, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Or. 1994). 
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 Id. at 362. 
139
 Mechler v. United States, 12-1183-EFM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108466, at 23 (D. 




 Id. at 23-24.  
KANSAS’S EXPANSION OF CERCLA TO INCLUDE  
STATE STATUTES OF REPOSE 
270
Circuits, holding that CERCLA encompasses, and thus preempts, state 
statutes of repose. 
Ultimately, when interpreting the meaning of Congress’ language, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t will not be presumed that a 
federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the 
state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so.”142 
Furthermore, § 9658 is a preemption statute, and “[p]reemption laws are 
construed narrowly.”143 Thus, a decision, like that of the Fifth Circuit, to 
apply § 9658 only to the explicitly mentioned “statutes of limitation,” is 
consistent with Congress’ “clear manifestation”—application of “statutes of 
repose,” in light of its distinctions from statutes of limitation, is not. 
Aside from the Ninth and Fourth circuits, and now Mechler’s, 
questionable interpretation of § 9658, preempting state statutes of repose may 
also raise questions concerning due process violations for defendants. 
Notwithstanding the number of citizens possibly affected by the U.S. Air 
Force’s operations complained of in Kansas (where the Mechlers’ suit arises 
from the Forbes Air Force base that was established as far back as 1941 and 
closed in 1973), in North Carolina alone, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million people 
were exposed to contaminated water at marine base Camp Lejeune from 
1953 to 1987.
144
 Some diseases have extensive latency periods, causing them 
to sometimes develop decades after exposure to certain risk factors.
145
 If 
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statutes of repose are preempted by claims that are decades old—even before 
SARA was enacted—it could possibly violate defendants’ due process 
rights.
146
 While there is some Supreme Court precedent that suggests 
defendants’ due process rights would be violated if statutes of repose were 
preempted, there is just as much precedent to suggest that they would not be. 
The “Campbell line of cases” suggests that application of § 9658 to 
rules of repose is unconstitutional in some circumstances;
147
 they focus 
heavily on whether the nature of the legislature’s set time limits concern the 
remedy or the cause of action.
148
 The Campbell line of cases also seems to 
suggest that on one hand, when a statute sets a time limit on a purely 
procedural action, and does not create a vested interest for the defendant, 
there is no due process violation when the government alters that time 
limit.
149
 On the other hand, they suggest that altering the time period for a 
statute that creates a vested interest in the defendant may violate that 
defendant’s due process.150 Contrary to the Campbell line cases, the Usery 
line of cases suggests that the application of § 9658 to rules of repose may be 
constitutional—as long as it can meet the due process test of showing that the 
retroactive legislation is justified by a rational legislative purpose.
151
  
The two divergent lines of cases seem to suggest different conclusions 
as to whether the application of § 9658 of CERCLA to state statutes of repose 
is constitutional or not. Under the Campbell line of cases, Mechler’s (and the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits’) determination that preempting state statutes of 
repose would seem to violate defendants’ due process rights, especially when 
the legislation alters the time period for a statute that creates a substantive 
right for the defendant like with a  statute of repose.
152
 However, under the 
                                                                                                                         
MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA MORTALITY --- UNITED STATES, 1999—2005, (2009), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5815a3.htm.   
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Usery line of cases, a court would have to decide if § 9658’s retroactive 
elimination of a defendant’s vested right to repose serves a legitimate 
legislative purpose furthered by rational means.  
Ultimately, no definite statement can be made as to whether 
Merchler’s elimination of the U.S.’s right to raise the Kansas statute of 
repose violates its due process because it is impossible for the U.S. to raise a 
due process argument. However, given the varied views of the Campbell and 
Usery lines of cases, this issue may arise in the future when the defendant is a 
private party that is owed rights and duties under the constitution. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Although Mechler successfully increases the scope of relief available 
to Kansas citizens, its decision oversteps the power of the courts, and it does 
not discuss the difficult issue of balancing this decision with the possible 
deprivation of due process rights for defendants. Mechler’s holding follows a 
trend amongst federal circuits in that the terms “statute of limitation” and 
“statute of repose” are interchangeable (at least insofar as deciding whether 
CERCLA preempts statutes of repose). In aligning with the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits’ beliefs, despite potential interpretational and constitutional 
challenges, Mechler’s holding may influence other circuits to 
interchangeably use those terms. It may also add to the current majority view 
among district and circuit courts that state statutes of repose, in addition to 
state statutes of limitation, are preempted by CERCLA. There is much debate 
surrounding § 9658’s interpretation, and the incongruity between decisions 
will likely continue to increase until this issue is finally decided by the 
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